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Investigation of optimal capital
structure in Malaysia: a panel
threshold estimation
Abd Halim Ahmad and Nur Adiana Hiau Abdullah
College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Malaysia
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of leverage on Malaysian listed firms’
value and the optimal level of debt at which a firm could maximize its value.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors employ an advanced panel threshold regression
estimation developed in 1999 by Hansen that will indicate whether there are positive and negative
impacts of leverage on firm value. This estimation procedure has the advantage of quantifying the
threshold level of debt as compared to the ad hoc classification procedure of splitting the sample.
Findings – The results show that debt is only pertinent to the firm value up to a threshold level of
64.33 per cent. Additional debt beyond the threshold level does not add to a firm’s value. The appropriate
level of debt should be applied, which would thus maximize the firm and stockholders’ value.
Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to look at this issue
for Malaysian listed firms. The findings from this paper may provide a critical analysis of the usage of
debt in firms’ capital structure. An excessive level of debt could lead to a debt overhang situation and
insolvency at the microeconomic firm level; this could eventually could cause vulnerability in financial
systems and thus lead to the financial catastrophes.
Keywords Capital structure, Malaysia, Gearing, Public companies, Panel threshold, Optimal leverage,
Firm value
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Literature has stressed that excessive leverage or uncontrolled usage of debt has
resulted in a situation where East Asian companies become vulnerable to economic
downturn, as seen in the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 (Corsetti et al.,
1999). Domestic banks were burdened with high non-performing loans stemming from
the debt-servicing problem of corporate sector and macroeconomic weaknesses
(Krugman, 1999). An adequate monitoring environment on the level of debt at the firm
level is much needed (Driffield and Pal, 2010). However, this issue has not been given
much attention in the literature. Hence, the purpose of this study is to determine the
optimal level of debt at which a firm could maximize its value and to examine the effect of
leverage on Malaysian firms listed on the Main Market[1] of Bursa Malaysia during the
period 2005-2009.
It is important to know the optimal debt ratio as it could help financial managers
formulate an appropriate financing policy and take preventive measures to avoid a debt
overhang situation. Furthermore, policymakers might need to adjust the existing
debt-equity ratio of listed companies to protect investors’ interest and well-being. This
bridges the gap in the finance literature by providing evidence on how capital structure
affects firm value in an emerging market such as Malaysia.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1086-7376.htm
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In addition, the methodological issues associated with a short period sample in the
previous studies can be resolved by the use of panel data. Previous studies using
traditional linear models have proved a mixed relationship between leverage and firm
value (Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton et al., 1989; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Molik, 2005;
Berger and Bonaccorsi, 2006). Therefore, the usage of a non-linear panel threshold model
developed by Hansen (1999) could possibly solve the puzzle of the firm’s optimal debt
level or the trade-off between the benefits of tax shields for debt financing. This would
mean examining the optimal balance between the tax benefits of leverage and the
disadvantages of costs incurred from additional debt that might reduce a firm’s value.
The use of an advanced panel estimation technique in this article improves the statistical
power and efficiency of the econometric estimation. Thus, it reduces the parameter
estimation bias associated with a short period sample and homogeneous assumption
across the sample.
In order to examine our issues, we use Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression
method to quantify the regimes that would indicate the relationship between leverage
and firm value. This estimation procedure has the advantage of quantifying the
threshold level of debt rather than assuming the level of debt and hence using a
subjective classification procedure to split the sample. The usage of a non-linear
framework in determining the optimal level of debt has been utilized in the studies by
Nieh et al. (2008), Lin and Chang (2009) and Cheng et al. (2010). Nieh et al. (2008) and Lin
and Chang (2009) prove that debt ratios exceeding the threshold levels of 75.31 per cent
and 40.15 per cent, respectively, would not increase a firm’s value in Taiwan. However,
there has been very little research on the appropriate level of debt among firms,
especially in emerging economies such as Malaysia. In addition, differences in
accounting procedures, unique diverse institutional structures particularly in tax rates,
strength of creditors and equity rights, heterogeneity in the economic environment, and
different legal systems could lead to diverse financing structures (Rajan and Zingales,
1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996; Claessens et al., 2000; Booth et al., 2001;
Alves and Ferreira, 2011).
There are a few studies in Malaysia that look into the effect of debt issuance and
determinants of capital structure. This includes Krishnan and Moyer (1997) who
examine 81 firms from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. They find capital
structure is influenced by institutional or country set ups. Suto (2003) assesses 375
non-financial listed companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (presently known
as Bursa Malaysia) from 1995 to 1999. He tests whether capital structure could be
determined by governance variables such as dependency on banks, ethnic ownership
structure and controlling ownership concentration. Suto suggests that ethnic ownership
is not related to debt ratio, which implies that ethnic ownership could not discipline
the management as compared to foreign ownership. Deesomsak et al. (2004) analyze the
determinants of capital structure of firms in four countries namely Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore and Australia for the period 1993-2001. They show that there is a significant
difference on the determinants of capital structure across countries since these countries
have different set ups in term of financial markets, legal traditions, bankruptcy codes
and corporate structure. In addition, they also find that financial crisis of 1997
has changed the determinants of firm’s capital structure decision and the impact varies
across the sample. However, none of these studies could suggest the optimal debt ratio.















































upgrading the method, data and analysis as compared to the previous studies. To the
best of our knowledge, there are no studies examining the optimal debt level in Malaysia
using a non-linear panel threshold model.
Based on a panel sample consists of 467 firms with 2,335 observations, our results
show an existence of a threshold debt ratio of 64.33 per cent for listed firms in
Malaysia. This indicates that raising the level of debt beyond the threshold level
should be avoided as it does not add value to a firm, and excessive usage of debt could
lead a firm into a debt overhang situation.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on
capital structure. Section 3 explains the data and econometric methodology. Section 4
presents and discusses the estimation and testing results. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the article.
2. Review of the literature
Most of the previous theoretical and empirical studies have been undertaken following
the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958) who offered the capital structure
irrelevance proposition. According to them, there is no optimal level of debt at which
a firm could maximize its value. However, MM’s perfect market assumption is
contradictory and unrealistic in real-world practices. Subsequently, MM (1963)
introduce the taxation effect where firms should take on a maximum amount of debt to
increase a firm value through tax shield, but this could only be true at a lower financing
rate (Miller, 1977). Based on the trade-off theory (Myers, 1984), firms could borrow up to
the level that equates to the marginal costs and benefits of each additional unit of
financing. As for the pecking order theory, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)
hypothesize that there is no well-defined target debt ratio since asymmetric information
problem exists between the firm and the financiers. Firms would normally use internal
generated funds and, if additional funds are needed, they would then go for external
financing that carries a higher rate.
A number of empirical works on leverage and firm value measured by performance
have produced conflicting evidence. Kyerboach-Coleman (2007) finds that capital
structure has a positive impact on the performance of microfinance institutions. In
addition, Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006) prove that higher leverage could reduce the
agency cost of outside equity and therefore increase a firm’s value. Bos and Fetherston
(1993), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Molik (2005) also report a positive relationship
between leverage and firm performance. Nevertheless, some studies also find a
negative link between leverage and performance (Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton et al.,
1989; Booth et al., 2001). While there is considerable empirical evidence to show the
relationship between leverage and firm value, little work has been done on the evidence
of non-linearity between leverage and firm value. The exceptions are the studies by
Nieh et al. (2008), Lin and Chang (2009) and Cheng et al. (2010). Nieh et al. (2008)
investigate the optimal level of debt ratio for listed electronic firms in Taiwan from 1999
to 2004. The study finds that the appropriate debt ratio for the listed electronic firms
in Taiwan should not be more than 51.57 per cent or less than 12.37 per cent. Nieh et al.
(2008) also prove that the optimal debt ratio should be within the range of
12.37-28.70 per cent. Using a larger set of sample with different industries in Taiwan,
Lin and Chang (2009) prove that a debt ratio of more than 33 per cent would not increase















































reduction of firm value in China if the debt ratio is more than 70 per cent. The different
optimal levels of debt in previous empirical studies show that the right level of leverage
depends on the development of institutional structure in the country as well as
differences in tax policies and legal systems. This has been supported by the study by
Wald (1999) who finds that firms’ capital structure choices are different across the
sample study countries (France, Germany, Japan, UK and the USA).
The contradictory results that appeared in the previous studies and literature,
which devoted little attention to the empirical evidence in emerging markets in this
particular topic, have inspired us to undertake this study. In summary, the objective of
this study is to test whether the use of debt in the capital structure will affect firm value
of Malaysian listed companies. This study applies the panel threshold regression
model to assess whether there is an optimal debt level at which point threshold effect
and asymmetrical relationship between the debt and firm value may exist. The
findings from this study shed light on whether or not the trade-off theory holds with
respect to an emerging economy such as Malaysia.
3. Data and econometric methodology
The sample consists of the listed firms on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2005
to 2009. As has been the case in previous studies, financial institutions and insurance
firms are excluded since the accounting presentations of their financial statements
are significantly different from those in the other sectors. In addition, firms with
missing values during the period are also excluded from the sample. After the screening
procedure, the final balance panel sample consists of 467 firms with 2,335 firm-year
observations for each variable[2]. The data are drawn from the Datastream International.
Following Nieh et al. (2008) and Cheng et al. (2010), we use return on equity (ROE) to
represent the firm value. There are two categories of explanatory variables in the panel
threshold estimation of Hansen (1999). The debt ratio (ratio of total liabilities to total
assets) is treated as the threshold variable to determine whether there is an asymmetric
threshold effect of leverage on the firm value. The second category of variable is used to
control for other factors namely sales to income growth, annual percentage change in
total assets and market value of equity to book value of equity that could hypothetically
influence the firm value. These proxies have been used by Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and
Simpson and Gleason (1999). Sales to income and annual percentage change in total
assets are employed to represent the growth of the firm; market value of equity to book
value of equity will capture the potential risk of the firm’s equity market.
First, since the data series are in panel form, we employ panel unit root tests to
determine whether or not the variables in the model are stationary. Among the panel
data unit root tests are Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003), augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and PP-Fisher x2 (Phillips and Perron, 1988). The tests are
testing the null hypothesis of unit root.
After confirming that all variables are stationary, the threshold autoregressive
model developed by Hansen (1999) is estimated. The panel threshold autoregressive
model takes the following form:
Vit ¼
mi þ u
0hit þ b1dit þ 1it if dit # g
mi þ u
















































u ¼ ðu1; u2; u3Þ
0
hit ¼ ðsit; git; pitÞ
0
Vit represents a firm value which is measured by ROE; dit (debt ratio) is the explanatory
variable and also the threshold variable. There are three control variables hit which may
affect firm value. u1,u2,u3 represent the coefficient estimates of the control variables;mi is
the fixed effect that represents the heterogeneity of firms under different operating
conditions; b1 is the threshold coefficient when the threshold value is lower than g; b2 is
the threshold coefficient when the threshold value is higher than g; the errors 1it are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), with mean zero and finite
variance s2(1it , i.i.d.(0, s2)); i represents different firms and t represents different
periods.
Hansen (1999) utilizes the simulation likelihood ratio to test for the asymptotic
distribution of threshold estimate. Using the two-stage ordinary least squares (OLS)
method and minimizing the sum of squares of errors, S1(g), the estimators of the
threshold value and the residual variance ĝ and ŝ 2 can be obtained[3]. In the testing
procedure, the null hypothesis of no threshold effect is tested, H 0 ¼ b1 ¼ b2, using
likelihood ratio test where F1 ¼ ðS0 2 S1ðĝÞÞ=ŝ
2 where S0 and S1ðĝÞ are sums of
squared error for null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis, respectively. Since the F1
has non-standard distribution, Hansen (1996) shows that the bootstrap procedure will
construct p-values and critical values that are asymptotically valid. When the
alternative hypothesis holds, H 0 ¼ b1 – b2, it shows that there is a threshold effect
between debt ratio and firm value. Thus, asymptotic distribution of threshold estimate is
tested with the null hypothesis, H 0 ¼ g ¼ g0, using the likelihood ratio statistics test
of LR1ðgÞ ¼ ðS1ðgÞ2 S1ðĝÞÞ=ŝ
2. The asymptotic confidence interval is shown as




where for a given asymptotic level b, the null hypothesis
of g ¼ g0 is rejected if LR1ðgÞ exceeds cðbÞ.
Furthermore, the model is modified if double thresholds exist. It can be shown as:
Vit ¼
mi þ u
0hit þ b1dit þ 1it if dit # g1
mi þ u
0hit þ b2dit þ 1it if dit g1 , dit # g2
mi þ u
0hit þ b3dit þ 1it if g2 , dit
8><
>>:
where the threshold value is g1 , g2. The model can be extended to multiple
thresholds using the same process ðg1; g2; g3; . . .gnÞ.
4. Empirical results
Following Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression estimation procedure, panel unit
root tests are adopted to confirm that the variables are stationary at I(0) in order to
avoid incorrect inferences if the condition is not met. Table I shows the panel unit root
tests of Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003), ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and PP-Fisher
x2 (Phillips and Perron, 1988). We find that all the variables are stationary at I(0) or
have stationary characteristics since nulls of the unit root are rejected. This allows















































Table II presents the F-statistics for the single, double and triple thresholds effect
together with their bootstrap p-values. We apply 100 bootstrap replications for each of
the three bootstrap tests. The F-statistics of 68.07 shows that the single threshold is
significant at 1 per cent level since it is higher than the critical value of 28.97. However,
the tests for double threshold and triple threshold effects are insignificant with the
bootstrap p-values of 0.220 and 0.760, respectively. Hence, we conclude that there is
evidence of a single threshold effect of debt ratio on a firm’s value for Malaysian listed
firms. Henceforth, we focus on the single threshold model for the rest of the estimation
results. It is shown that the estimated value of the single threshold is found to be
64.33 per cent thus splitting all observations into two regimes.
Table III presents the estimated coefficients based on OLS standard errors and
White-corrected standard errors. We see that the debt ratio has a negative and significant
effect on firm value. The coefficient of our primary interest are those regression
coefficients, b1;b2, by each regime. The first regime’s estimated coefficient is 0.2586,
Variables LLC IPS ADF-Fisher x2 PP-Fisher x2
ROE 272.417 (0.000) 214.240 (0.000) 1,308.32 (0.000) 1,584.18 (0.000)
Debt ratio 2225.757 (0.000) 228.354 (0.000) 1,193.53 (0.000) 1,498.07 (0.000)
MVBV 241.362 (0.000) 211.266 (0.000) 1,217.32 (0.000) 1,567.03 (0.000)
Sales to income growth 250.624 (0.000) 217.842 (0.000) 1,473.40 (0.000) 1,709.85 (0.000)
Asset growth 2243.685 (0.000) 232.211 (0.000) 1,590.42 (0.000) 1,880.25 (0.000)
Notes: The numbers in brackets represent p-values; the sample comprises of 467 Main Market firms
listed in Bursa Malaysia from 2005 to 2009; ROE is the ratio of net income and total equity; debt ratio is
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; MVBV is ratio of market value of equity to book value of
equity; sales to income growth is the annual percentage change of sales to net income; asset growth is
the annual percentage change in total assets
Table I.
Panel unit root tests
Test for single threshold
64.33
F1 68.074
p-value 0.000 * * *
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (16.11, 21.93, 28.97)





(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (13.19, 21.24, 29.33)






(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (8.422, 9.205, 19.891)
Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 per cent; F-statistics and p-values are from repeating
bootstrap procedures 100 times for each of the three bootstrap tests
Table II.

















































which is significant at 5 per cent. This implies that ROE increases by 0.2586 per cent with
an increase of 1 per cent in debt ratio for firms that have a debt ratio of less than or equal
to 64.33 per cent. In the second regime, if debt ratio is greater than 64.33 per cent, the
estimated coefficient is 0.0079. Nevertheless, it is insignificant which implies that there
is no relationship between debt ratio and firm value when debt ratio is greater than
64.33 per cent. The result is intuitive; suggesting that increasing debt ratio beyond the
threshold value of more than 64.33 per cent would have no impact on the firm value and
would just add to the existing level of the firm leverage. Our findings of single threshold
effect of debt ratio on firm value corroborate the findings of Nieh et al. (2008) for electronic
firms in Taiwan with 75.31 per cent as the threshold value. The control variables
considered in this paper show that annual changes in total assets and market to book value
are significantly and positively related to ROE or firm value. This implies that the greater
the assets growth rate and the higher the market to book value ratio, the higher the firm’s
value. The estimated coefficients of total assets growth rate and the market to book value
are 0.00089 and 0.0861, respectively. Although the sales to income growth variable shows
that it positively influences firm value, it is not significant from both the results of both
OLS standard errors and White-corrected standard errors.
5. Conclusions
The decision to allow for a certain level of leverage lies with the financial managers
and this important decision may have an impact on the performance of the firm.
The objective of this study is to investigate whether financial leverage has an effect on
the firm value and whether there is an optimal level of debt at which a firm could
maximize its value in the context of listed firms in Malaysia. An advanced panel
threshold regression model by Hansen (1999) is employed to test the effect of debt ratio
on the firm value among 467 Malaysian listed firms from 2005 to 2009. The estimations
have shown that there is a single threshold effect between debt ratio and firm value.
Thus, the threshold value split the observation into two regimes with only the coefficient
of the lower regime being significant.
This article provides new evidence on the existence of threshold debt ratio of
64.33 per cent for listed firms in Malaysia. This result partly supports the trade-off theory
Regressors Coefficients OLS SE tols White SE twhite
Asset growth 0.00089 0.00037 2.4054 * * 0.00034 2.6176 * *
Sales to income growth 4.21 £ 10205 0.000134 0.3151 0.000067 0.6312
MVBV 0.086145 0.009438 9.1275 * * 0.032175 2.6774 * *
Debt ratio 20.006026 0.001690 3.5657 * * 0.001882 3.2019 * *
g1 # 64.33% 0.2586 0.1093 2.3660 * * 0.1390 1.8604 *
g2 . 64.33% 0.0079 0.1113 0.0709 0.1265 0.0624
Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 per cent; the sample comprises of 467 Main Market firms
listed in Bursa Malaysia from 2005 to 2009; debt ratio is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
MVBV is ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity; sales to income growth is the annual
percentage change of sales to net income; asset growth is the annual percentage change in total assets;
g1 refers to the first regime and g2 refers to the second regime; OLS SE and White SE are the



















































that firms seek a level of debt that balances the benefits of interest tax shield and the
incremental cost of debt financing. However, this is only true when the debt ratio is equal
or below the threshold level. Beyond this, the marginal costs might exceed the marginal
benefits. In this case, the level of debt is 64.33 per cent. If a firm has a low debt ratio, the
financial managers are advised to increase the respective debt level to 64.33 per cent.
However, raising the level of debt beyond the threshold level should be avoided as it does
not add value to the firm and there is a potential for the firm to find itself in financial
distress should the cost exceed the benefits of debt financing. Other variables that
significantly explain the performance in this study are assets growth rate and the market
to book value ratio. Future work needs to be carried out to further clarify how ownership,
firm-specific and market variables affect firms’ value in order to confirm the present study.
Notes
1. The Main Market of Bursa Malaysia comprises of listed firms from all sectors such as
consumer products, industrial products, construction, trading and services, technology,
finance, hotel, properties, plantation and mining. Companies that are listed in the Main
Market are financially stable that have a proven track record.
2. Hansen (1999) panel threshold specifically designed for a balanced panel dataset. It is
uncertain whether the asymptotic properties could be extended to unbalanced data.
3. The first stage estimates the sum of the square errors for any given threshold (g). In the
second stage, ðĝÞ is obtained by minimizing the sum of the squares.
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